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ABSTRACT 
 In this paper a model of cognitive dynamics is proposed, for interpreting classroom as 
well as teacher training processes, nowadays supported also by some recent 
neuroscience results. Core relevance in the model is assigned to a basic resonance 
dynamics, assumed to work at the root of all the modulations, from perception to 
abstract thinking, and interferences characterizing knowledge construction. On the basis 
of this theoretical framework, teachers are seen as “resonance mediators,” i. e. experts 
who favor the resonance process in their students; correspondingly, any teacher training 
process has to accomplish this result. Finally, we will briefly examine a school episode, 
showing how a teacher, playing this role, acts effectively both on students’ 
understanding and on their motivation. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Many cognitive theories have been developed in recent years. For a general 
frame, concerning in particular mathematics education, we refer to Tall (2004). Among 
other things, Tall notices an emerging strand of researches into brain activity, where a lot 
of experimental data have been collected from those concerning innate numerical 
competences to those based on Brain Imaging Techniques, applied to subjects engaged 
in elementary arithmetic tasks (Dehaene, 1997; Butterworth, 1999). 
In this paper a particular model1 of cognitive dynamics is employed, in order to 
draw some consequences for teachers’ role and for their training strategies. The model is 
presented in depth in Iannece and Tortora (2007a, 2007b), Mellone (2007), and is 
outlined in Guidoni et al. (2005a), so we will present here only some of its essential 
features. This model has been developed mainly on the basis of our classroom 
experience but nowadays it is supported also by the above quoted 
neurophenomenological studies.  
The importance of focusing the attention on a cognitive model arises when we 
recognize how teachers’ beliefs about the essence of mathematics, the ways of 
knowledge transmission and the ways people learn and understand are relevant in 
teachers’ behaviors. Very often these beliefs are just embodied in daily practice and 
partially unconscious but notwithstanding they determine automatic small and large 
scale decisions in the conduct of class activities. For instance, teachers can act as 
knowledge transmitters just because they are merged in the Piagetian milieu, where three 
basic assumptions operate: scientific concepts – inserted as they are in a structured 
                                                 
1 We use the word “model” in a weaker sense than the one used in hard sciences, but more suitable for a quite 
unformalized domain like math education. 
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cultural system – are the only ones that allow valid knowledge; they are obtained by 
substitution of the originary everyday concepts; the reasoning of any educated mind 
follows the formal rules of logic. Therefore, a first task in any teacher training is to let 
these beliefs emerge, in order to be compared and discussed (Mason, 2002). Then, 
usually only as a consequence of a shared agreement, a necessity can arise to modify 
these beliefs, and to assume new views that turn to be more effective in designing, 
managing and assessing learning environments and didactic actions. 
This paper is arranged as follows: in the second section we present our model of 
the understanding process together with some related results from neuroscience; in the 
third section we derive our views about the role of teachers and some strategic lines for 
teacher training; the fourth and last one is devoted to an illustration by means of an 
example of the potential impact and the possible outcomes of our assumptions. 
A distinctive feature of our cognitive modeling is the key word resonance, used 
as a powerful metaphor for learning processes. We borrow it from physics,2 where it 
denotes the increase of the amplitude of enforced vibrations, taking place whenever the 
frequency of the source is approaching one of the proper frequencies of the receiving 
system. We can see resonance phenomena in a lot of fields of common experience, 
sometimes with catastrophic consequences, like when a bridge can be destroyed by 
virtue of a prolonged sequence of quite weak earthquake waves. Or everyone who has 
been on a swing knows very well how movements of the legs can expand or extinguish 
the swing amplitude, depending on their accordance with the swinging frequency.  
Much in the same way, we say that a learning process, which is always the 
result of a complex interaction between different variables, is driven by a resonance 
dynamics when different cognitive items (an idea, a mental construct, an image, an 
action, etc.) are simultaneously activated whenever one is evoked, producing by 
reciprocal interference a mutual reinforcement effect. But, as we will see in the sequel, 
what is even more important for educational goals in mathematics is to put in resonance: 
(1) the actual potentialities of individual cognitive structures; (2) the patterns supplied by 
codified cultures; and (3) the constraints of the real world. Finally, the circumstance that 
in evolutionary theories of the brain, the term “resonance” appears also as a key word in 
modeling human cognitive behavior, which, as we will show in the next section, does 
not seem to us a simple coincidence. 
To activate resonance, or, even better, to guide children to consciously look for 
resonance, is one of the necessary conditions that allow them to be in the mood to 
succeed in understanding. This is a hard task for any teacher, while the task of research 
is to investigate how this can be accomplished at best. The importance of the pivotal role 
of teacher-researchers – whatever this means – is quite evident.  
 
2. OUTLINE OF A COGNITIVE MODEL 
In every didactic action we recognize very schematically at least four basic 
“model-ingredients:” (i) a realistic, even rough, model of “natural” cognitive dynamics; 
(ii) a global, epistemologically founded view of mathematics as an internally structured 
scientific discipline; (iii) a modulated view of the variety of interferences of 
mathematical thinking with other cultural fields (mainly scientific and technological 
ones), and with everyday culture(s); and (iv) a model of cultural transmission in 
                                                 
2 The word resonance appears not only in physics but in many other contexts with different meanings. In an 
educational context, for example, it is employed by Comiti et al. (1996), as a measure of the responsitivity of 
teachers to students’ interventions. 
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knowledge areas, in particular, scientific ones. Such ingredients, obviously crucial to 
teaching profession, are clearly correlated to each other: in particular, the basic framing 
role assumed by i) with respect to other aspects is clear. 
In order to characterize our cognitive modeling, we feel it necessary to root it 
within the complex landscape of the cognitive theories available nowadays. In particular, 
we draw attention to the fact that many critical aspects of cognition have been variously 
regarded in the course of time within different (often reciprocally contrasting) cognitive 
theories and/or epistemological positions. Actually, our basic research finding is that 
most of such aspects appear relevant in interpreting experimental teaching/learning 
evidences: and this directly implies their reciprocal complementarity. For example: 
It is now quite common to refer to Vygotsky’s views about the crucial role 
assumed by a natural language in the development of knowledge, since the earliest age 
(Vygotsky, 1934). However, such a role is only in a minor part an automatic, passive 
one: careful observations of cognitive transactions show that an early, active adult 
mediation plays a key role in fostering resonances and preventing dissonances 
(“misconceptions” appear as the result of missing/wrong/misleading mediations between 
developing cognition and culture): Apart from the “stages” machinery, some insights by 
Piaget appear to be crucial to outline features of cognitive dynamics. Assimilation, 
accommodation, and (temporary) equilibration lively define the main modes of any 
resonance process.  
The point is to correlate such views within a comprehensive dynamical model: 
and the resonance dynamics frame, as described in Guidoni et al. (2005b), actually lends 
itself to account for many crucial correlation aspects as we want to show. So, we assume 
that any true learning in scientific/mathematical field is a result of the process of 
resonance between individual cognition, social culture and reality structures along 
cognitive paths efficiently addressed and controlled in their meaning-driven dynamics. It 
requires, at any level, also resonance between various “dimensions” of natural thinking 
(Guidoni, 1985): perception, language, action, representation, planning, interpretation, 
looking for sense, etc. We can schematize our view by means of a triangular schema, 
resembling the famous Chevallard triangle but with different variables on its vertices. 
 
 
 
We want to stress: (a) the complexity of every “vertex,” in particular of the 
“natural thinking” because of its multidimentional and time-dependent character; (b) the 
two-way direction of the arrows that marks the impossibility to uniquely determine the 
thinking process.  Looking for resonance is a very useful and flexible tool for teachers in 
driving a didactic action and in reflecting on it, and for children in understanding how 
they understand. Let us go into some clarifying details.  
In a Vygotskian perspective, we know that the roots of a large number of 
culturally sophisticated concepts, like those of mathematics, can be found in the ways 
children spontaneously face the complexity of the surrounding world, far before they are 
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involved in school contexts. For example, very early on it is necessary to correlate things 
and properties changing in time: a typical cognitive strategy is to give causal 
explications to these phenomena, trying to interpret, often forcefully, a variation of a 
property as a cause or an effect of the variation of another. Here, we clearly recognize 
the “natural” cognitive root for the dependance of a variable from another that is the 
mathematical concept of function. Of course, things are all but easy: a natural thought 
strategy cannot go very far in managing mathematical complex situations, where abstract 
structures come into play typically neglecting semantical counterparts. In this case, a 
search for resonance guides teachers in addressing the development of natural strategies 
toward a goal of reification and nominalization; just like in the sense of Vigotsky. 
Again, let us suppose that children work with numbers, their operations and 
properties. For natural numbers (natural not by chance!) it is easy to see a 
correspondence between the things around us, our perceptions and actions, and finally 
the mathematical structures. So, a teacher can utilize the correspondence between reality 
and our natural ways of thinking to build suitable mathematical structures, again 
according to a Vygotskian evolutionary perspective.  
But the problems arise when new kinds of numbers come into play. Trying to 
root again multiplication by zero (see Section 4, below) or between negative numbers in 
the reality can be the first spontaneous attempt both for teachers and for learners, but the 
circumstance that the correspondence with reality, already observed for natural numbers, 
does not work anymore could provoke irreparable consequences in children’s minds, like 
severe separation between intuition and mathematical knowledge, if not the first refusal 
of being involved in active learning. All this can be avoided if teachers wisely guide 
their students in the complex play of resonance. This time the need for a rich and sound 
mathematical structure must be invoked, pointing for instance to natural strategies of 
generalization or to a natural ability to structure a new game. Reality comes only 
afterwards, perhaps when we are able to recognize that the multiplicative structure of 
integers offers a powerful model for a more complex physics phenomenology.  
A more detailed example will be discussed in Section 4 below. For other 
examples, see Iannece and Tortora (2007b) and Mellone (2007), and also some of the 
papers contained in this book and in the PDTR PISA Handbook, e.g. De Blasio et al. 
(2008) and Pezzia et al. (2008): In all these examples, referring to various school grades, 
several positive outcomes of our resonance model can be observed, among others: (a) the 
ability to autonomously utilize one’s informal knowledge to support the construction of 
formal knowledge, and, in the opposite direction, the ability to give a sense to formal 
knowledge interpreting it within informal contexts; (b) the ability to select linguistic 
tools according to specific objectives; and (c) a marked growth of self-esteem. 
All these examples and, more generally, the goal of promoting resonance 
between the mathematical constructs and natural cognitive structures suggest deepening 
of knowledge of the latter. We will try to do this in the next section using some recent 
neuroscience research results.  
 
The development of human brain, prerepresentations, mirror neurons 
Leron (2004) says that “Human nature [can be seen] as a collection of universal, 
reliably-developing cognitive and behavioral abilities – such as walking on two feet, face 
recognition or the use of language – that are spontaneously acquired and effortlessly 
used by all people under normal development. Common sense is a cognitive part of 
human nature, the collection of abilities people are spontaneously and naturally good-
at.”  
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Many research streams deepen the Leron’s notion of human nature, showing the 
existence of other universal behavioral abilities, like the ability to formulate hypotheses 
(Changeux), or to control the coherence of argumentation (Houdé), or to use metaphors 
(Lakoff & Núñes). And there are still a lot of things to discover, as it is easy to recognize 
just observing, as we do everyday, the learning process of students of every age. Using, 
as we do, an extensive meaning for the word “natural,” our construct of resonance 
appears well expained by Vygotsky’s dychotomies between natural/scientific concepts 
and natural/higher psychic functions (Vygotsky, 1934). 
Some models of the working and cognitive behavior of the brain, recently 
devised on the basis of experimental neurophysiology data, highlight how our synaptic 
structures develop according to a continuous learning process. We mainly refer to 
Changeux (2000) for these results. Today, they offer new experimental confirmations to 
Vygotsky’s hypotheses about the social nature of learning and the evolutionary character 
of concepts and of the psychic functions mediated by culture: these ideas are part of our 
own modeling. 
According to Changeux, our brain is characterized by a marked “structural 
plasticity”, due to a continuous interaction with the external environment and to a likely 
continuous internal reworking (e.g. dreams, thoughts, and imagination). It develops 
according to two distinct but related processes: on a biological scale, it is the outcome of 
a Darwinian selection of the most advantageous representations of the external world 
(for this idea, see also Edelman, 1987), on an individual scale, it changes according to a 
never-ending learning process. Spontaneously, the neurons generate impulses and 
transitory synaptic connections are activated, giving rise to “prerepresentations” of the 
external world. In a sense, as foreseen by many authors, like e.g. Neisser (1981), our 
brain does not simply receive information from outside but throws its own interpretative 
schemata in. In this way, knowledge origins as a result of selection and stabilization of 
prerepresentations, guided by a “cognitive relevance” principle, similar to that studied by 
Sperber and Wilson (1993) in communication theory. The relevance is marked by a 
correspondence with reality: “The answer coming from outside is decisive. It constitutes 
a test of how the prerepresentation fits in the environment.”3 
Therefore, the spontaneous activity of our neurons can be seen as a natural 
aptitude to explore and modelize the physical world. Recalling also Galilei’s words: “Ma 
io stimerei prima la natura aver fatto le cose a modo suo e poi i pensieri degli uomini 
atti a capirla,”4 a possible answer can be found to the ancient question about the more or 
less innate nature of mathematical concepts, in the sense that the innate numerical 
abilities (Dehaene, 2000; Devlin, 2002) can also be seen as the result of an epigenetic 
selection of neural networks, stabilized as the most effective to mankind survivance.  
A noteworthy amount of recent neurophenomenological results concern the 
primacy of the perceptual-motory brain system also in the processing of higher 
functions, with a central role assigned to the so-called mirror neurons (see, e. g. Kohler 
et al., 2002; Gallese & Metzinger, 2003; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005): For these results we 
mainly refer to Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2006) where many of them are collected and 
supported by experimental data. The basic hypothesis is that the roots of any cognitive 
process stand in the motory cortex that is to say in our actions. “Processes that are 
                                                 
3 Changeux, 2000, 65; our translation from the Italian edition. A lot of data supporting these assertions can be 
found there. 
4 “I would suppose that nature [comes] before made things and then men’s thoughts capable to understand 
them,” our translation from Galilei (1964).  
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usually considered of a higher order, like perception or recognition of the acts of other 
people, imitation and also gestural and verbal forms of communication, can be referred 
to the motory system, where they find their neural background.”5  
The physiological bases of this integration are the so-called “canonical neurons” 
and “mirror neurons.” The former codify motory acts, i.e. not just movements in 
themselves but movements having a specific goal (see Iannece & Tortora, 2007a, for 
more details). In other words, there is an area (F5) in our brain where a kind of 
vocabulary of actions is stored. Some of these canonical neurons are excited when we 
act for a particular goal, as well as when we just observe an object on which an action 
can be done (e.g., seeing a cup on a table stimulates the potential – complex – act of 
picking it): So, what happens is that the vision of an object generates in our brain a 
prerepresentation: “A brain that acts is, first of all, a brain that understands,” in the 
words of Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2006):6  
The mirror neurons are so called because they reproduce actions of people in 
the brain of other people: e. g., they are excited when we move our hand to pick 
something as much as when we see someone moving their hand for the same goal. Due 
to them, our vocabulary of actions can be viewed as our cognitive budget to understand 
and interpret actions of other people. Now, this budget is strongly modified by a learning 
process, therefore, the things that we understand “without effort” vary according to how 
our own experience and knowledge develop. The notion of elementary (effortless) tasks 
is crucial. They are accomplished by means of innate brain circuits (typically those 
deputed to treat sensory-motor information), automatically activated when the exigence 
of guaranteeing survivance occurs: to drink when thirsty, to escape in front of a danger, 
to recognize a face, etc.  On the other hand, an effort is necessary when other areas and 
functions (e.g. memory and imagination) of the brain are involved. It is more or less the 
same Vygotskian distinction between elementary and higher psychic functions. Of 
course, most of the tasks involved in the learning of mathematics are of the second type.  
In an interesting experiment Houdé et al. (2000; see also Iannece et al., 2006, 
for details) show that activating emotions can be crucial even for complex reasoning,7 
since effortless (perceptual) strategies are inhibited in favor of rational ones, more 
suitable for the specific goal (of a logical type, in the case studied): This confirms that 
two different kinds of “reasonings” are both natural for us, although the former is more 
“spontaneous” (in the sense of Vygotsky), while the latter requires an effort. We claim in 
Guidoni et al. (2005a) that in mathematics education, like in any complex learning 
environment, the key is not that of inhibiting a kind of reasoning strategy in favor of 
another, but to put them in resonance, i. e. to consciously pass from a cognitive 
dimension to another in a continuous reinforcing game. Houdé himself says: “Le cerveau 
de l’homme est una sorte de jungle où le competence du bébé, de l’enfant e de l’adulte, 
sont à tout moment susceptibles de se télescoper, d’entrer en competition, en même 
temps qu’elles se construisent” (2000). 
In eveyday life, our way of understanding is a process of continuously 
projecting outside prerepresentations looking for a feedback from the external world. In 
our opinion, the same thing happens within an abstract cultural context: attempts and 
errors, conjectures validated or refused are the ingredients of the dynamics by which our 
                                                 
5 Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2006, 122; our translation. 
6 ibidem, 3, our translation. 
7 According to Damasio (1994) there is a very strict relation between rationality and emotions, at the level of 
brain circuits. 
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brain works in order to understand. Therefore, in any education context, it is necessary to 
favor this process: our resonance model and our didactic choices are made following 
these assumptions.  
 Coherently, we look at the formal structures of mathematics as at one of the 
two principal cultural tools by which the phenomena of the external world are 
interpreted and described (another one being physics): Today, the prevailing view of 
mathematics, within most curricula, emphasizes its a priori separateness from other 
scientific areas, thus conflicting with natural cognitive processes, and causing many 
students’ difficulties. On the contrary, if mathematics is perceived as an a posteriori 
abstraction coming through a modelization process, its “cognitive” resonance stimulates 
students’ motivated interest toward its structural development and allows them to reach 
quite high levels of formalization.  
We are not saying that mathematics should be reduced to a mere language for 
physics nor physics to a simple field of examples of mathematical structures. We are 
saying that it is necessary to recognize that: a) the same cognitive process underlies both 
disciplines; b) both can be viewed as discourses (in the sense of Sfard, 2000), 
characterized by different rules but complementary in their role of cognitive 
reconstructions of the reality; c) this complementarity is a precious resource from an 
educational point of view. In this sense, the cultural constructs of physics are a bridge 
between the perception and the more abstract notions of mathematics: for example, the 
physical concept of motion fills the gap between the variety of experienced movements 
and the symbolic mathematical treatment. We take it a step further: introducing abstract 
structures as linguistic tools to describe and reason about things is the strongest way to 
motivate even their autonomous disciplinary development. 
But what does it mean to put individual cognition and reality structures in 
resonance? We suggest that attention should always be paid to all those models and 
strategies that have been developed by mankind as a whole, and are developed by each 
individual in order to interpret and manage often unconsciously the daily experience. We 
are thinking of Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia’s “vocabulary of actions” or the “schemata” 
described in Lakoff e Núñez (2005): When observing everyday human actions and 
reasonings, it is easy to recognize how such models and strategies are generally 
employed, and also how complex and sophisticated they can be.8 But what is essential 
for educational purposes, is to observe them at work in students’ behaviors.  
In the first section we have already proposed the example of the relationships 
between two changing variables. But also the order relation, the direct proportionality 
(Guidoni et al., 2003) are all models that are employed very early, independently from 
one’s linguistic tools, and the same happens for thinking strategies like the dychotomy 
concrete/abstract (in children’s words: “by truth or by fiction”): see Iannece and Tortora 
(2007b) for more examples. 
 
3. TEACHERS’ ROLE 
In Section 1, we have recalled how, according to Piaget, the scientific concepts 
are constructed. This view assigns to teachers the role of knowledge transmitters. On the 
contrary, in our model of cognitive dynamics, where the focus is on the integration 
                                                 
8 For example, when crossing the street with heavy car traffic, a human being (but also, say, a cat) must 
uncounsciously and rapidly activate sophisticated controls of distance and speed, and of their variations, in 
order to avoid danger. 
 66
(resonance) among natural thought, real world and culture, teachers play a completely 
different role which we call resonance mediation (Guidoni et al., 2005b):  
“Pick them up where they are then find a path which guides them to the place 
you want them to reach.” According to this famous Wittgenstein’s mot, teachers must 
recognize in every class context the “space of cognitive configurations” (let us use again 
a metaphor from physics), in order to design possible learning trajectory paths, drawn on 
all the available resources. In general, they will adopt teaching strategies that are not 
imposing but supportive of potentialities. Teachers should create, on a local level, the 
many possible links between individual cognition, social culture and reality structure 
through the use of dynamics of abstraction and de-abstraction (modeling and de-
modeling) with graduality, coherence, flexibility and competence. 
In other words, what teachers have to do is first of all to make explicit and to 
foster all natural models and strategies of their students. This means, for instance, that, 
when recognizing proportional thinking as a spontaneous strategy for interpreting real 
phenomena, the right thing to do is not to reinvent ex novo the corresponding 
mathematical notion, but to favor the development of the language which appears 
appropriate to express it, exploiting suitable learning environments (Iannece & Tortora, 
2004): 
According to the above-mentioned Houdé’s words, many ages always coexist in 
our minds. Therefore, teachers could and should exploit the synergy of all those 
cognitive dimensions, rather than being cast down for the so frequent cognitive 
regressions of their students.  
A critical awareness and a responsible assumption of such a role surely make 
teachers reflexive and also in some cases turn them into true researchers. In working 
with in-service teachers, where teachers and students are simultaneously involved, this 
awareness and this assumption of role are supported by the immediate and long term 
interaction with the cognitive processes of learners. Several years of research on our part 
in the formation of school teachers, based on didactic strategies gradually validated, have 
convinced us that the guided collective participation in modelization or problem solving 
processes makes up a privileged entrance into the world of the combined acquisition of 
knowledge and professionalism. It is important to highlight that the cognitive dynamics 
put into play by in-service teachers (and by pre-service teachers in training as well) in 
substance correspond to what takes place in class; likewise the crucial role played by a 
meta-cognitive attitude is analogous both on an individual and group scale. We have also 
noticed that it is important in all situations to alternate auto-directed work of 
manipulation and interpretation either individually or in small groups (including 
substantial homework) with collective guided work of comparison and analysis of partial 
results, yet leaving to the individual the final systemizing of results and interpretation of 
the processes being adopted.  
As said above, two kinds of activities appear as critical keys for both teachers’ 
formation and students’ learning: modelization processes from every day experience 
contexts and word problems. For word problems, we refer to Guidoni et al. (2003) and 
Tortora, (2001), where some of our views are reported; a similar analysis can be found in 
Mason (2001a). Here, we want to say a few more words about the modelization process. 
In mathematics education literature, not to mention other fields, the meanings 
assigned to the word “modelization” considerably vary (see, e.g. Mason, 2001b and 
Verschaffel, 2002). Therefore, it is necessary to begin with an explanation of what 
“modelization” means for us (contrasting it for example with Verschaffel’s definition). 
The data on the functioning of the brain show that our way of interaction with the 
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external world lays on powerful, often unconscious, neural mechanisms for interpreting 
it: so, in a very general sense, a “model” is nothing more than a linkage between the 
things that happen and the brain that tries to understand them. According to this, we 
interpret modelization as a very complex process, neither deterministic nor one-way, 
where the formal structures are seen as one of the different correlated ways into which 
the cognitive reconstruction of external world structures takes form. This process cannot 
be reduced to guiding students toward abstraction, through a standard hierarchy of multi-
representations (actions, words, graphs, and so on) whose top is identifiable by the 
algebraic formulation of a physical law. Due to the subtended cognitive dynamics, what 
is most effective is a continuous shifting from one cognitive dimension to another in a 
mutual progressive enhancement. And the process itself requires very lenghty didactic 
paths, even extended over the whole school curriculum.  
A systematic resort to modelization processes in mathematics education, 
because of their resonance with natural learning strategies, enhances also students’ 
motivation allowing them to actively participate in the construction of culturally 
validated theories of course within the cognitive and linguistic bounds of every age. At 
the same time both teachers and students can distinguish between a substantial continuity 
of the natural and scientific ways of organizing knowledge, and an essential 
discontinuity in terms of systematicity and inner coherence (a distinction which recalls 
again Vygotsky’s dychotomy between a natural and scientific thought):  
Therefore, it is important to make the first moves in the abstraction process 
starting from perceptual-motory experiences, which allow the involved notions to 
develop better and to be transferred to other situations. The choice of the contexts to be 
explored is always addressed by some conditions. Some contexts are surely privileged, 
like, e. g., motion (Balzano, 2007), springiness (Guidoni et al., 2003; 2005b), shadows 
(Boero et al., 1995), since they contribute to approaches characterized, since the 
beginning of the cognitive path, by direct manipulations guided by reflection on what is 
being observed. A good context should be at the same time simple enough to allow for 
an exploration not too rigidly guided, and complex enough to demand a careful, previous 
individuation of interacting systems and of pertinent variables, and to allow formulating 
non trivial conjectures. 
We conclude emphasizing once again that collective and guided modelization 
activities bear an intrinsic value, independently from the mathematical content that they 
allow to build: a cognitive, a metacognitive and also an emotional value, inasmuch they 
are resonant with the natural way of functioning of our minds, and provided they are 
accompanied by the awareness of the development of our thought processes. 
 
4. SOME EXCERPTS OF A CASE STUDY 
Here we present a brief account of a class episode, in order to illustrate how the 
construct of resonance can help teachers in designing and managing class activity, as 
well as the interaction teacher-tutor in the training process. We refer to situations faced 
by some teachers of our team that are presented in De Blasio et al., (2008), where more 
details of the activity can be found. 
Teacher (Nicoletta) with a mainly pedagogical background wanted to explain to 
a third-grade class, the role of zero in the multiplication of natural numbers. She tried to 
put reality and disciplinary structures in resonance, using the “linguistic” mediation of an 
action procedure. This worked very well until the zero was not involved:  
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As usual for me, I looked for “real” stories to support children in their construction of meaning for 
the operation. So, I proposed a movement activity where children were required to go back and forth 
on the number line then I said: “Go forward 4 steps 0 times” 
Children’s reactions were very interesting:  
Anna: I am not able to do this, I can’t move... What is the sense of the words “4 steps zero times”? I 
would never ask anyone to make 4 steps zero times. 
Giovanni: 4 × 0 is not really a multiplication! A multiplication needs repetition of an action; it needs 
the ‘times.’ 
Alessia: The word ‘multiplication’ is obtained by putting together two words: ‘multi,’ that means a 
lot and ‘action.’ Then multiplication means to carry on a lot of actions. But when there is zero 
there is no action, so we have to choose a new name... Perhaps we can still decide to call it 
multiplication but with a different meaning. 
Of course, the children encountered serious difficulties in extending the familiar 
model of multiplication of natural numbers to this new “strange” situation. Till now, the 
cognitive strategies based on actions, strongly embodied according to Rizzolatti and 
Sinigaglia (2006), supported the conceptualization of the multiplicative structure, and, 
coherently, Anna and Giovanni tried to refer to those strategies, in order to understand. 
On the contrary, Alessia felt a dissonance between teacher’s request and the “action” 
meaning of multiplication and, rather than forcing the motor-perceptual metaphor, 
displayed a different cognitive behavior which turned out to be resonant with a typical 
mathematical process: to enlarge the meaning of an operation. To solve the problem, 
Alessia resorted to a direct resonance between the mathematical structures and her own 
cognitive resources – the aptitude to change the rules in a game, in order to respect 
coherence constraints, – while neglecting reality, the third pole of our triangle. This kind 
of reasoning, of course more refined than the previous one, was still natural (Iannece et 
al., 2006), in fact it was spontaneously activated. 
Alessia’s intervention opened a way toward a higher level of shared 
understanding. Nicoletta, though at first bewildered, was able to recognize this 
opportunity by virtue of her participation in the project and of her exposition to teachers’ 
formation activities, as described in her diary: 
In a sense, my students were trying to convince me about the uselessness of my searching for a 
concrete situation that constituted a metaphor for this operation. To my great surprise, the students 
revealed a natural aptitude to change their point of view, jumping from reasoning supported by 
observation to logic argumentation. Alessia even analyzed the structure of the word “multiplication,” 
looking for the sense of the operation. 
Analyzing with mentors my students’ reasoning, I became aware that not all mathematics can be 
discovered starting from observation of the reality. In fact, there are some rules that can be justified 
only by the necessity of an internal coherence of mathematics as a discipline. 
But a still greater surprise was that my difficulties in leaving concrete motivations for mathematics 
rules were not shared by my students: for children the acceptance of a sort of game rules led to a 
generalization of already established meanings. 
The sequel of the activity designed and guided in collaboration with my colleagues in the project and 
with my mentors successfully brought me and my students into encounter with a problem that I had 
never solved before: why is it impossible to divide by zero? 
A new story begins… 
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